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Abstract This paper introduces an agent-based model that explores the relationships between education, social networks, and 
support for democratic ideals. This study examines two factors thai affect demoaatic support , education, and social networKs. 
Current theory concerning these two variables suggests that positive relationships exist between education and democratic support 
and between social netwol1\"s and the spread of ideas. The model contCiins multiple variables of democratic support, two of which 
are evaluated through experimentation. The model allows irKIividual entities within the system to make "decisions" about their 
democratic support independent of one another. The agent·based approach also aUows entities to utilize their social networks to 
spread ideas. Current theory supports experimentation results. In add~ion , these results show the model is capable of reproducing 
real world outcomes. This paper addresses the model creation process and the experimentation procedure . as wen as future 
research avenues and potential shortcomings of the model. 
1 , INTRODUCTION 
How do Democracies arise? It is not 
possible to answer this question in a simple 
or quick manner. Democracies tend to take 
decades to fully form, so studying the 
variables that lead to their rise is not a task 
one can achieve in a week. The process 
requires extensive examination of literature 
and history. However, the study of the 
relationships between variables that affect 
democracy can occur in a much shorter 
period using Agent Based Modeling (ABM). 
In order to conduct initial experimentation 
with this new method, th is study only 
examines the effects of a few variables on 
the rise of democracy; the main variable we 
examined being democracy, with social 
networks serving as a medium for ideas to 
spread, allowing us to examine the effects 
of social networks on idea transference. 
Based on a study of the relevant literature , 
the hypothesis for this experiment is: 
increases in the education transfer variable 
will lead to an increased number of 
democratic supporters, over a 100 step 
(year) cycle. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the current literature on 
democracy revealed that democratic ideals 
influenced by education positively affect 
support of democracy [13] , [15] , [8] , [5], [4] . 
Democratic states and states transitioning 
to democracy often have strong liberal 
education systems. These systems help 
pass on the basis of democratic ideals to 
every generation, resulting in a population 
that approves of and supports democracy 
[7] , [4]. 'Mlere these strong liberal 
education systems are lacking, states often 
experience lower levels of support for 
democracy {6]. 
Much of the literature focuses on the fact 
that creating a culture of democracy is 
important to improving democratic support. 
This tie is into the concept of democratic 
ideals, or a system of beliefs, which match 
with a democratic form of government (5] , 
[8] . Consequently, where these ideals are 
less or completely absent, one would expect 
democracy to be non-existent, or the 
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system severely flawed. Therefore, the 
current theory concludes that support for 
democracy, on a national level, is 
contingent on a system of democratic 
ideals, which the populace receives during 
the education process. 
In addition to education, the literature 
highlights the relationships between 
democracy and other cultural and economic 
influences; with economic variables being a 
common theme in most of the literature. 
VVhile this variable appears to influence 
democratic ideals, in conjuncture with 
education, there is no clear connection for 
how the two relate to each other. Vvtlile it 
would seem safe to assume that 
economically secure individuals would 
receive better educations, none of the 
literature clearly states this. As a result, for 
the purpose of this study, economic factors 
will remain locked, and consist only of a 
random distribution of wealth among 
agents. 
An additional variable, which the literature 
identifies as important to the spread of 
ideas, is social networks. Current literature 
highlights several ways that an individual's 
social network can influence them. Many 
individuals find themselves in situations 
surrounded by others that share the same 
democratic ideals as they do; but they also 
find themselves surrounded by individuals 
that have different democratic ideals [18]. 
The likelihood that an individual will accept 
another's democratic beliefs is based on 
how strong their current beliefs are, as well 
as the amount of effort the other person 
expends trying to instill their democratic 
ideals. For these reasons, the literature 
clams there is no more than a fifty percent 
chance that an individual will accept 
influence from either side [18]. 
As opposed to the immediate influence 
that individuals receive from others within a 
particular propinquity, current literature also 
discusses how individuals accept influence 
from their friends and family. Unlike 
influences applied by individuals in a 
person's proximity, a person can choose the 
friends and family from whom they are 
willing to accept influence. Recent literature 
argues that during the current era people 
are not limited to only accepting influence 
from friends and family that hold the same 
beliefs. In fact, since democratic ideals can 
change at a rapid rate , individuals are 
willing to accept influence from those with 
the same ideals, as well as those with 
differing views [1 6], [171. 
Because of the above-mentioned 
literature, this study not only looked at 
individuals within a person 's immediate 
proximity, but also the individuals that are 
involved within a person's far-reaching 
network. Additionally, this study did not limit 
individuals to accepting influence from those 
who share the same democratic ideals, but 
allowed for individuals with differing 
democratic ideals to influence a person. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
To create the model for this study we 
followed a two-step process: create a 
metacode, and then input the true code into 
NetLogo. NetLogo is an agent based 
modeling environment developed on the 
Java platform. The software allows users to 
create and program agents, giving them 
sets of instructions for interactions and 
behaviors. The user can then create 
interactions amongst agents, and 
experiment with the interactions to 
determine how changes in individual 
behavior affect the overall behavior of the 
model. Metacode is a rough outline of the 
intended process for a program, in this case 
an agent-based model, and represents a 
high-level view of how the model will 
function. 
After we created the metacode, we began 
to write the program in NetLogo. VVhile 
transferring the metacode into true code we 
often found problems that required us to 
add modules to the main program and in 
some cases change some of the basic 
processes. Figure 1 shows the final model 
format, in NetLogo, with the added variables 
and the final variable control formats . 
Agents within the model follow a set of 
procedures to perform the following actions 
during each "step": they decide whether to 
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educate or not; they receive education (if 
they are at a location) ; they interact with 
their social network and local community; 
they decide whether to become a supporter, 
detractor or remain neutral ; they perform 
actions to possibly give birth or die; and 
they move. To examine the main variable, 
education, agents within the system perform 
an initial check to determine two things: are 
they close enough to an education location 
to attend and are they the right age to 
attend . The radius in which agents must be 
to attend a location is determined using a 
slider (education-influence-radius), which 
we did not adjust for this experiment due to 
computer processing constraints. Along 
with the number of locations avai lable for 
agents to receive education, we felt that 
increasing or decreasing these variables 
would result in predictable outcomes 
(agents would be more likely to support 
democracy where radius and education 
locations were high and vice versa). The 
important variable we did allow to change in 
order to examine the effects of education 
was the level of education agents received 
at the education locations. Agents who 
attended a location receive X amount of 
"education" each year until they reach the 
age of 18. Agents in the model do not have 
to go to an education center unless they are 
within the variable range determined by the 
education-influence-radius. Therefore, 
agents who "live" away from education 
centers (those further away from a center 
than the value of the education-influence-
range variable) would not receive education, 
while those close by would. In addition, 
agents could receive education anytime 
after the age of five, until they were 18. 
Therefore, agents not encountering a 
location when their age reached the 
minimum could still enter a location later. 
At the beginning of each run of the model, 
agents look within a certain radius , as well 
as looking to a certain number of other 
agents in their extended social network, to 
receive influence (support or detract). The 
model contains a multitude of options for 
adjusting agent's social networks. The 
model allows for the selection of the 
immediate radius from which each agent will 
look to for support influence. As the range 
of the social network increases, the agents 
will have more companions from which they 
can draw either positive or negative 
democratic support. VVithin this process, we 
built in a measure of randomness by 
ensuring the distribution of agents would 
result in different numbers of neighbors in 
each individual's range. After each step in 
the model, the agents move a couple of 
spaces in different directions; this allows 
agents to move in and out of the influence 
radius of others. 
As for the extended social networks of the 
agents, or more simply a network that is not 
limited to a certain radius, there are also 
options that allow the user to manipulate the 
model. First, the user has the option to 
choose in which type of extended network 
the agents witt participate. The three 
options are normal, uniform, or constant 
distributions. The normal distributions 
assign each individual a number of agents 
to participate in their extended network 
using the normal distribution to determine 
the exact number. The uniform option uses 
a simple random procedure to determine 
the number of agents within a certain 
individuals extended network. The uniform 
distribution does not follow the bell curve 
but allows every number in the random 
number range to have an equal opportunity 
of being selected, resulting in random 
numbers of agents in each network. Lastly , 
the constant distribution gives all agents the 
same number of individuals within their 
extended network. 
During every time step of the model, 
agents look within their social network, 
which includes their immediate radius and 
extended social network, and determine 
agents from which they will accept either 
democratic support or non-democratic 
support. In order to do this, the model is 
designed to follow the assumptions 
described in the literature, and a coin-flip 
procedure determines whether the agents 
accept influence (i.e. agents have a 50150 
chance of accepting or rejecting influence). 
This works the same for both democratic 
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influence and non-democratic influence. If 
an agent accepts influence the amount they 
accept, which remains constant, is either 
added or subtracted from the democratic 
support variable. Agents receive greater 
influence from their non-immediate network 
(representative of their family and friends) 
than from their neighborhood. We made 
this decision because influences an 
individual receives from family and friends 
tend to be stronger than influences they 
accept from strangers. If agents accept 
democratic influence, the support variable 
increases, but if they accept non-democratic 
influence, the support variable decreases, 
In addition to the two main variables we 
examined, agents also performed checks to 
gain or lose wealth and to decide whether to 
support democracy or not. Because 
economics was not a focus of our 
experiment or our hypothesis, but is an 
important variable in democratic support, we 
included a procedure to allow agents to gain 
or lose wealth. For simplicity sake we used 
very basic procedures to allow agents to 
gain or lose wealth; if an agent is in the 
upper 15% of the population in wealth they 
have a greater chance to gain more wealth , 
while those below the 50% median have an 
equal chance to loose or gain wealth. We 
felt this procedure was necessary to 
represent the fact that individuals with large 
amounts of wealth are better able to protect 
their wealth and may be able to continue to 
gain it, while those with less wealth have a 
harder time protecting and gaining wealth. 
Agents follow a procedure of checking 
their wealth , education and support levels to 
determine if they will became a supporter or 
detractor. We set thresholds for these 
variables (for support and wealth they did 
not change) and agents check all three, 
deciding to be a detractor if they fell below 
all three-threshold levels, and deciding to be 
a supporter if they were above. As 
explained previously, agents accept support 
or non-support from their neighbors and 
social network. We included this variable 
and allowed it to shift in order to provide a 
way to examine the effects of social 
networks, and to allow agents to decide 
whether to support democracy based on 
variables other than just wealth or 
education. Because it is not realistic to 
assume that all educated and wealthy 
people will automatically support 
democracy, we included the democratic 
support variable to allow agents to decide 
not to become supporters, even if they were 
wealthy and educated. 
,. 
4. RESULTS 
In order to experiment with this model we 
ran 12,961 trials using a variety of variable 
settings. Utilizing the behavior space 
feature within NetLogo, we were able to 
sample six variables across multiple 
settings. For several variables (Populace-
education, Democratic-educated, and 
Democratic-uneducated) we did not sample 
the entire variable range due to time 
constraints . In addition, we did not include 
the remaining sliders and switches 
(education-location, death rate, birth rate, 
and network distribution) in this experiment 
because we did not wish to test their direct 
effects on democracy. 
Results of our experiment showed that 
overwhelmingly democratic supporters 
outnumbered democratic detractors (91 % of 
the time). 
Supporters Detractors 
outnumber outnumber 
Detractors Supporters 
Runs 11,795 1,166 
Table 1. Total times each group 
outnumbered the other 
Total 
number 
of runs 
12,961 
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In addition, the average percent of agents 
in the system that were supporters was 
33%, while only 5% of the agents were 
detractors, 
Average Average Total 
number of number of number 
Supporters Detractors of agents 
90 15 300 
Table 2. Average results of a run 
Across multiple runs , this demonstrates 
that in almost ali instances democratic 
support arose within the model, across 
multiple variable settings. However, the 9% 
of runs, which resulted in democratic 
detractors being the majority, demonstrated 
that variable settings did affect the outcome. 
In order to gain a better understanding of 
what our results showed, we constructed a 
linear regression model of the results, 
finding that all variables except network 
density had a significant effect on 
democratic supporters (results appear in 
appendix 1). Our regression model 
included all variables from the model that 
changed (Populace-education, Democratic-
educated, and Democratic-uneducated, 
Network-density, and local-community). 
The resultant adjusted R-square value of 
0.544 shows that this model was robust and 
captured a large portion of the variability 
within the model. In addition, the high F 
value (2581.219) shows that the model was 
significant. 
The regression coefficients from this 
model showed that almost all variables had 
the expected relationships with our 
dependent variable (based on the literature 
review). One variable which did not 
demonstrate an expected relationship with 
democratic support was the detractor 
threshold variable. The regression model 
showed that as the threshold to become a 
detractor rose, democratic supporters in the 
model fell. V'vtlile this result appears 
counterintuitive, the regression analysis 
does not take into account the overall 
number of decorators and supporters in the 
model (I.e. even as decorators within the 
system fall due to a higher threshold, 
democratic supporters in the system do not 
necessarily rise) . This result demonstrates 
that the two groups, detractors and 
supporters, do not vary based on each 
other's numbers. This finding supports our 
belief that the model adequately captures 
real world behaviors. Had the regression 
analysis shown that these variables had 
opposite relationships with the dependent 
variable, it would suggest that they might 
have an effect on each other as well. For 
this model to be accurate, the number of 
democratic supporters or detractors should 
not influence the other beyond moderately 
affecting the size of the influential 
population pool. This result is in no way 
conclusive that the two variables are not 
connected, but it does indicate their limited 
connectivity, which implies the number of 
supporters and detractors within the model 
is mostly able to vary independent of one 
another. 
The other variables within our model-
demonstrated relationships that the 
literature suggests should exist. All three 
remaining variables that were significant 
had positive relationships with democratic 
supporter numbers. V'vtlile one of the 
variables we focused on (education) had a 
positive significant relationship with 
democratic supporters, the variables 
relating to social networks were not both 
significant. The variable representing the 
agent's social network extemal to their 
location (I.e. those they agents not in direct 
or near direct contact with) was not 
significant. However, because agents were 
able to move within the system, this is likely 
the cause for the local community (agents in 
direct or near direct contact with each other) 
having an effect on the outcome. The limit 
of social networks in this model is that they 
do not expand as agents encounter each 
other; since the social network is not able to 
expand throughout the agents "life", it has a 
fixed effect on the outcomes, which appears 
to be insignificant. In order to verify this 
finding we would need to re-run this 
experiment and allow the agents network 
density to vary across several distributions 
to determine if the effect is fixed or not. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
~he results of this model, across multiple 
vanable settings, indicate that the model 
agrees with current theory. The fact that 
democratic supporters did not always 
outnumber detractors also indicates that the 
outcomes are not hard-coded into the 
model. V\Jhile the sensiti vity does appear 
somewhat low (as demonstrated by the fact 
that democratic supporters outnumbered 
detractors 91 % of the time), the model did 
not produce an overwhelming majority of 
one outcome or the other. If we had added 
other variables or added additional variable 
settings in the experiment, it is likely that the 
results would likewise have varied, This is 
especially true for the number of education 
locations. In order to further test the effect 
of education on democratic support we 
would allow the number of locations to vary, 
and examine how this affects the model's 
results . 
The model also captured the relationship 
between the spread of democratic ideals 
and social networks. In addition to the 
effects education had on democratic 
support, the relationship between individual 
agents and their immediate community 
reveal that external influences also playa 
large role in determining an individual 's 
views of democracy. However, the model 
does seem to represent a very small 
majority of real world situations. The 
inclusion of social networks, which reach 
across distances greater than an immediate 
"neighborhood", is more representative of a 
country with advanced telecommunication 
networks. Because countries do not all 
possess advanced communication networks 
allowing all their citizens to communicate 
with friends and family over vast distances 
instantaneously, the model is not 
representative of all possible states. 
However, we could replicate countries 
without these advanced communications 
ne~orks by removing the network density 
vanable from experimentation. 
\Nhile this model is not representative of 
all countries, which will take further 
experimentation and testing to correct, it 
does match well with the current state of the 
world. In countries with advanced 
communication networks and good 
education systems, the predominant form of 
government is democracy. Our model 
adequately reflects this , demonstrating that 
the model is relatively accurate, in terms of 
recreating real world situations. We expect 
that removing social networks and running 
the experiment again would likewise affect 
the model and produce results more 
representative of countries without 
advanced telecommunication networks. 
Another possibly inaccurate aspect of the 
model is the number of education locations 
we allowed to exist. For the purpose of this 
experiment, we decided to vary the level of 
education agents received and not the 
number of sources where they could receive 
th~i~ education. We expect that lowering or 
raising the number of locations will have the 
same impact on the number of democratic 
supporters. Based on the construction of 
the model, a high number of locations will 
inherently affect more agents and introduce 
more education into the model. We 
therefore decided to remove this variable 
from this experiment as we expected its 
impact would be too great on the outcomes 
of our experiment. In future tests , we would 
include this variable and examine how it 
affects the models results . Should it 
produce results differing from what we 
~xpect, it would provide interesting insight 
Into how the number of education locations 
available to individuals may positively or 
adversely affect their education. 
In terms of validation, this model appears 
to be a valid representation of the real 
world . However, we could not identify a real 
world case to compare our results too, in 
furtherance of this conclusion. In future 
validation procedures we plan to empirically 
test this model against real world cases of 
countries where democratic support is the 
majority opinion of the people, and 
somewhere it is not. If through further 
validation our model proves to be an 
accurate representation of real world 
situations then our results would further 
reinforce current theory concerning 
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education and democracy. The results 
would also support the notion that social 
influences are an important factor in 
determining an individual's support of 
democracy. Our results from this 
experiment support this notion and suggest 
that individuals are heavily influenced both 
by the people they encounter in contact 
with, and by the education they receive, 
6 . ApPENDIX 
6.1 Regression Tables 
Democratic Supporters Regression Model 
Tables 
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